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People tend to underestimate the work involved in completing tasks and consequently finish tasks
later than expected or do an inordinate amount of work right before projects are due. We present a
theory in which people underpredict and procrastinate because the ex-ante utility benefits of anticipating
that a task will be easy to complete outweigh the average ex-post costs of poor planning.  We show
that, given a commitment device, people self-impose deadlines that are binding but require less smoothing
of work than those chosen by a person with objective beliefs. We test our theory using extant experimental
evidence on differences in expectations and behavior. We find that reported beliefs and behavior generally
respond as our theory predicts. For example, monetary incentives for accurate prediction ameliorate
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Jonathan-Parker@Kellogg.Northwestern.eduThe context of planning provides many examples in which the distribution of outcomes in
past experience is ignored. Scientists and writers, for example, are notoriously prone to
underestimate the time required to complete a project, even when they have considerable
experience of past failures to live up to planned schedules.
- - Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
1 Introduction
Faced with an unpleasant task, people tend both to underestimate the time necessary to complete
the task and to postpone working on the task. Thus projects often take inordinately long to
complete and people struggle to meet, or even miss, deadlines. Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
terms this behavior the planning fallacy, and such overoptimistic beliefs and behavioral delays
seem to be important factors in a wide range of human economic behaviors, from ￿ling taxes or
doing referee reports, to planning for retirement or making investments in one￿ s health.
This paper makes two contributions. First, we develop a theory of the planning fallacy and
derive its implications. In our theory, people are biased toward believing that a project will be
easy to complete because such a bias increases expected utility more than it decreases utility
due to poor smoothing of work over time. People understand that they have a tendency to
poorly smooth future work over time and so they may choose to commit to future actions by
imposing deadlines on themselves. Procrastination and the desire for deadlines arise solely from
optimistic beliefs, as in Kahneman and Tversky￿ s description, rather than through preferences,
as in most of the extant economic research on procrastination and commitment (e.g. Laibson
(1997), O￿ Donoghue and Rabin (1999a), and Gul and Pesendorfer (2004)).
Second, we test our theory using evidence on both behavior and, importantly, beliefs. In
general, observed behavior can be matched both by some utility function for agents with objec-
tive beliefs and by some other utility function with some other model of beliefs.1 The common
approach to this identi￿cation problem between beliefs and preferences over outcomes is to make
the assumption of rationality, perhaps based on philosophical arguments.2 We instead address
this identi￿cation problem by using data on beliefs. We derive the testable implications of our
model for beliefs and test these using variation in both observed behavior and reported beliefs
across experimental treatments. The predictions of our model for both beliefs and behaviors
across treatments are largely consistent with the actual pattern of beliefs and behaviors found
in psychologists￿experiments on the planning fallacy. This ￿nding supports our model of the
planning fallacy and the use of survey data on expectations to discipline research in behavioral
economics.
1With enough data on the same choice situation and enough assumptions about preferences, one can achieve
identi￿cation, as for example in Savage (1954).
2Two versions of these arguments bear mention. First, rationality is sometimes viewed as providing greater
evolutionary ￿tness. But these arguments are speci￿c to particular environments and utility functions, and are
overturned in other environments. The failure of this argument in general follows directly from the original
identi￿cation problem. A second argument is that people should learn true probabilities over time, which simply
pushes back the assumption of rationality to one of rational learning and so is still an assumption rather than a
scienti￿c basis for distinguishing among models.
1To be more speci￿c about our theory, we study the planning fallacy in a model of a person
who faces a task of uncertain total di¢ culty and who has quadratic disutility from work in each
of two periods. Right before the ￿rst period, prior beliefs are set, and the person may choose an
intermediate deadline. In the ￿rst period, the person gets a signal about the total work involved,
beliefs are reset, and the person decides how much work to do. In the second period, the person
completes the task, however di¢ cult it turns out to be.
Without an intermediate deadline, two features of the model lead a person to exhibit the
planning fallacy. First, the person has anticipatory utility. Thus a person who initially believes
that the task will be easy to complete has higher expected utility because he anticipates less work
in the future. This ￿rst ingredient provides an ex ante anticipatory bene￿t of overly optimistic
beliefs. Second, the person optimizes given his beliefs. Thus a person with optimistic beliefs does
little work in the present and ends up poorly smoothing work over time. This second ingredient
implies an ex post cost of optimism on average: optimistic assessments lead to potentially costly
delays and/or rushing at the end. Given these two ingredients, it is natural for people to exhibit
the planning fallacy because a little optimism has ￿rst-order ex ante anticipatory bene￿ts and,
by the envelope theorem, only second-order ex post behavioral costs. We de￿ne well-being as
average lifetime utility and show that optimistic beliefs optimally balance these bene￿ts and
costs. This gives us a theory of the planning fallacy and procrastination that is endogenous
and situational. The severity of belief bias and of procrastination is larger the greater the
anticipatory bene￿ts of optimism and the less the ex-post costs of misplanning.
With a prior choice of intermediate deadline, if the person understands this later tendency
to postpone work, he may choose to impose a binding deadline on his future self. When the
intermediate deadline binds, during period one the person can still get the bene￿ts of believing
a task will be easy to complete without the costs of poorly smoothing work over time. Thus
beliefs that induce a binding deadline can make the agent better o⁄ on average over time. And
hence optimal beliefs are time-inconsistent: beliefs are initially somewhat realistic, so that the
person chooses a deadline that binds and smooths work, and later more optimistic, so that the
person during the ￿rst period gets the bene￿ts of anticipating little work.
Because we assume that peoples￿beliefs optimally balance the anticipatory bene￿ts of more
optimistic beliefs and the ex post costs of poor smoothing of work e⁄ort over time, the per-
son￿ s beliefs, his choice of deadline, and the extent of procrastination are all endogenous and
situational, giving testable predictions across environments.
To be more speci￿c about our testing, we ￿nd that the predictions of our model are generally
consistent with experimental data and survey data on both beliefs and task-completion times
reported in the psychology literature on the planning fallacy. In particular, we derive and test
eight predictions of our model. (i) As our model predicts, expected and actual completion
times are highly correlated across people within an experiment and across experiments. That
is, reported beliefs are informative and not simply noise. (ii) Our model predicts that framing
does not cause the planning fallacy. In existing experiments, we ￿nd that the fallacy is robust
to many, but not all, framing manipulations and attempts to de-bias beliefs. (iii) As our model
predicts, where there is no bene￿t to optimistic anticipation as when the task is not onerous,
people￿ s behavior does not exhibit the planning fallacy. (iv) As predicted, when people are given
an opportunity to impose a deadline on themselves prior to beginning the task, they tend to do
so. (v) People impose deadlines that require less than perfect smoothing of work over time. (vi)
2The self-imposed deadlines increase performance, but not as much as exogenous deadlines that
impose perfect work-smoothing over time.
Finally, we modify our environment to match two di⁄erent experimental settings: one in
which subjects are paid ex post for rapid task completion and one in which they are paid for
accurate prediction of task completion times. (vii) As our model predicts, experiments ￿nd that
monetary incentives for rapid completion of tasks increase the degree of overoptimism. (viii)
Consistent with our model, monetary incentives for accurate prediction increase the accuracy of
people￿ s predictions, but, inconsistent with our model, this does not in turn lead to more rapid
completion, although this evidence is statistically weak.
Given the large recent literature on procrastination and commitment, it is worth empha-
sizing that the key novelty in our theory is that beliefs are endogenous and are the central
cause of procrastination and the demand for commitment, while in existing economic models
they play at most a secondary role. According to the conventional economic view, beliefs are
exogenously speci￿ed, typically as rational or naive, and procrastination occurs due to utility
costs of self-control or bene￿ts to delay. In one branch of the literature, people discount non-
exponentially in an otherwise standard time-separable utility maximization problem (following
Strotz (1955-1956)); in the other, people maximize utility that has an additional component,
￿ temptation utility,￿that makes it unpleasant to discipline oneself to work today (Gul and Pe-
sendorfer (2001)). In either case, procrastination occurs because the utility function places
special importance on the present relative to the future. Beliefs are less important. Whether
people understand their tendency to procrastinate (as in Laibson (1997) and Gul and Pesendor-
fer (2004)), are oblivious to it (as in Akerlof (1991)), or (exogenously) partially understand their
tendencies (as in O￿ Donoghue and Rabin (2001)), people still procrastinate.3 In our model,
people fail to smooth e⁄ort over time only because they endogenously mis-predict the di¢ culty
of doing the task in the future. Thus we focus on beliefs in testing.
This paper is also related to economic research that endogenizes beliefs, such as Akerlof and
Dickens (1982), Yariv (2002), BØnabou and Tirole (2002) and Bernheim and Thomadsen (2005).
While this paper is most closely related to Brunnermeier and Parker (2005), our analysis di⁄ers
in that we do not require that agents update as Bayesians. Relaxing this requirement gives rise
to the interesting phenomenon of agents self-imposing deadlines (or preference for commitment).
Third, this paper is related to economic research developing a scienti￿c foundation for the
modeling of beliefs. Survey data on beliefs have been used to test rationality or evaluate its
usefulness in the context of speci￿c models (Manski (2004)).4 The fact that our model largely
￿ts variation in elicited beliefs provides evidence that such data is not simply noise but has
meaningful variation, linked to behavior.
Finally, there are many psychological theories of the planning fallacy which focus on the
mental processes that lead people to fail to make correct predictions. These theories are gen-
erally consistent with our theory and inconsistent with rational models of procrastination and
commitment. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) argue that the fallacy arises because people ig-
nore distributional information available in related past outcomes and instead focus only an a
single plausible scenario for completion of the current speci￿c task. Liberman and Trope (2003)
3See also O￿ Donoghue and Rabin (1999b), Fischer (1999), and Harris and Laibson (2001).
4Other examples include Hamermesh (1985), Dominitz (1998), Nyarko and Schotter (2002), Souleles (2004),
and Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers (2004).
3apply construal level theory to temporal distance to argue that people view temporally distant
events in terms of a few abstract characteristics and so, when forming predictions, overlook the
host of potential di¢ culties and small tasks involved in task completion. Further, a large set
of papers on the planning fallacy have investigated whether the planning fallacy is caused by
incorrect memory of past events (that people are not aware of and so do not adjust for), such
as biased self-attribution. Buehler, Gri¢ n, and Ross (1994) (study 3) for example ￿nd that
people describe the reasons for their own past failures to meet expected completion dates as
more external, more transitory and more speci￿c than they describe the reasons for the failures
of others. Lastly, there is the general theory that people are optimistic, and this is helpful in
generating motivation, e⁄ort and persistence (see for example Armor and Taylor (1998)).
The paper is structured as follows. The next section introduces our model. Section 3 presents
our theory of the planning fallacy and relates it to a ￿rst set of experimental evidence. Section
4 shows how people mitigate their misplanning using deadlines and tests the predictions of
the model with behavior observed in experiments. Section 5 derives predictions of our model
for a broad set of experimental settings and tests these predictions using reported beliefs and
behavior. A ￿nal section concludes and an appendix provides proofs of all propositions.
2 The model
This section presents a model of the temporal allocation of work. We incorporate the option to
choose an intermediate deadline that commits the person to complete some amount of the work
early in the project. A ￿rst subsection describes objective uncertainty, subjective beliefs, and
utility; a second subsection presents the person￿ s well-being, the objective function for subjective
beliefs.
2.1 The environment
We consider a person ￿rst choosing an intermediate deadline and then how much work (wt ￿ 0)
to allocate to completing a task in each of two periods, t = 1;2.
The total work required to complete the task is random, and is given by ￿1 +￿2 where ￿t is
realized in period t. The person must complete all work by the end of period 2, so he faces the
constraint:
w1 + w2 ￿ ￿1 + ￿2. (1)
We assume that ￿1 and
￿2
￿1
are i.i.d. random variables with mean one and each with strictly
positive support [0;2].5 Importantly, this assumption implies that E [￿2j￿1] = ￿1 so that the
realization of ￿1 in the ￿rst period provides a good guide as to the realization of ￿2 in the second.
For example, the work involved in preparing for a midterm exam is a good indicator of the work
that will be involved in preparing for the ￿nal.6
5We also assume that each has zero probability of equalling zero. All propositions hold with probability one.
6The implication that E [￿2j￿1] = ￿1 also ensures that neither the rational agent nor the optimistic agent
chooses w1 > ￿1 which would lead to wasted work for some realizations of ￿2 ￿a situation in which our interpre-
tation of the mathematical structure becomes strained. Note also that all our results generalize to a setting in
which E [￿2j￿1] = ￿￿1 for ￿ 2 [0;1].
4The intermediate deadline requires that the person complete at least a fraction ￿ 2 [0;1] of
￿1, the work amount realized in period 1:
w1 ￿ ￿￿1. (2)
Since E [￿2j￿1] = ￿1, this can equivalently be viewed as requiring that the person complete ￿=2
of the total work on average in period 1.
The person holds subjective beliefs that may or may not coincide with the objective distrib-
utions. In particular, he holds prior subjective beliefs about the joint distribution of ￿1 and ￿2
immediately before observing ￿1, and holds subjective beliefs about the distribution of ￿2 dur-
ing period 1 after observing ￿1. We denote subjective prior expectations by ^ E [￿] and subjective
period-1 expectations after observing ￿1 by ^ E1 [￿], and we denote the corresponding subjective
(co)variances by ^ V ar[￿t], ^ Cov [￿1;￿2] and ^ V ar1 [￿2], where the last depends on ￿1. We require
that prior beliefs are internally consistent, satisfying Bayes￿rule, but we do not require that
period 1 beliefs follow from Bayes￿rule applied to prior beliefs, i.e., we do not require that
^ E [￿j￿1] = ^ E1 [￿j￿1].
At the start of period 1, prior to starting work and observing ￿1, the person chooses the
deadline, ￿, to maximize his expected present discounted value of utility ￿ ow, ^ E [V1], where
V1 := u(w1) + u(w2),
taking into account how w1 will be chosen as a function of ￿1 and that the task will be completed






Quadratic utility delivers certainty equivalence conditional on beliefs (for w1 ￿ ￿1), and implies
that only the subjective means and (co)variances of ￿t are relevant for behavior and expected
utility.7 We are assuming for simplicity that the future is not discounted.
During period 1, after observing ￿1, the person chooses w1 to maximize the expected present
discounted value of the utility ￿ ow, ^ E1 [V1], subject to meeting the deadline, equation (2). During
period 2, he completes the task.
2.2 The objective function for beliefs
We take a classical utilitarian rather than a traditional revealed-preference interpretation of the
objective functions. We de￿ne ^ E [V1] and ^ E1 [V1] ￿the expected utilities of current and future
work ￿as the person￿ s felicities in the instant he chooses the deadline and during period 1 as he
does w1, respectively. Thus the expected value functions represent a person￿ s current ￿ happiness.￿
That is, as emphasized by Bentham, Hume, B￿hm-Bawerk and other early economists, people
are made happy in the present ￿get more felicity ￿both by what they currently experience and
also by what they anticipate happening in the future.8 Since the happiness of people that plan
7Important for tractability, this property reduces the dimensionality of the problem of solving for optimal
beliefs about ￿t from in￿nite to two.
8See Loewenstein (1987) and the discussion of the Samuelsonian and Jevonian views of utility in Caplin and
Leahy (2000).
5for and care about the future is a⁄ected by their expectations of future events, people who care
about the future can get more current felicity not only by having better plans for their actions
but also by having more optimistic beliefs about future uncertainties.
People also get felicity in period 2:
V2 := ￿u(w1) + u(w2)
where 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1. Thus just as people get felicity from the future (anticipatory utility), they can
also get it from the past (memory utility). When ￿ = 0 the agent gets no utility (or disutility)
from past actions. When ￿ = 1, the agent discounts the past at the same rate that he discounts
the future. Felicity in the second period does not a⁄ect the agent￿ s actions given beliefs, but
does a⁄ect what beliefs are optimal, to which we now turn.
Since a person￿ s current felicity depends on his expectations about the course of the future,
he is happier in the present with more optimistic beliefs about the future. A person who believes
that a task is unrealistically easy to complete exerts less work in period 1 and ends up working
more in period 2. But such beliefs come at a cost: they sacri￿ce the bene￿ts of smoothing the
necessary work over time. There is thus a trade-o⁄ between optimism, which raises anticipatory
utility, and objectivity, which allows better smoothing of work over time.
To capture this trade-o⁄, we de￿ne a welfare function which we refer to as a person￿ s well-
being, W, as his average felicity over states and time. We refer to the beliefs that maximize
well-being subject to the constraints as optimal beliefs and de￿ne them as follows.
De￿nition 1 Optimal beliefs are the set of probability distributions de￿ned on the support of




^ E1 [V1] + ^ E2 [V2]
i
(3)
given that actions are optimally chosen given beliefs subject to resource constraints, where





(1 + ￿)u(w1) + u(w2) + ^ E1 [u(w2)]
i
:
In a deterministic setting, this collapses to an example of the social welfare function proposed
by Caplin and Leahy (2004). We choose this welfare function for the following reasons. First, as
argued in Caplin and Leahy (2000), with anticipatory utility, it is natural to consider a welfare
function that is the (weighted) sum of felicities, rather than utilities, over time. Second, and
perhaps more important, this choice of W has the advantage that if expectations were objective
and ￿ = 1, well-being would coincide with the person￿ s expected felicity in each period:
1
2E [E [V1] + V2] = E [u(w1) + u(w2)] = E [V1] = E [V2].
In this case, a person￿ s actions that maximize felicity also maximize well-being, so that any
distortion of behavior from that chosen by an objective agent would reduce well-being. Alterna-




^ E1 [V1] + V2
i
/ u(w1) + ^ E1 [u(w2)] + E [u(w2)],
6and well-being simply adds subjective anticipatory utility to the optimization problem that
would be faced in period 1 under rational expectations.9
3 The planning fallacy
To begin our analysis of the model, this section shows the optimality of the planning fallacy
when a person is not faced with the option of a deadline. Since choices are only made after ￿1
is realized, we simplify the exposition by assuming ￿1 is a constant. We let ￿2 be distributed
with mean E1 [￿2] = ￿1 and variance V ar1 [￿2] > 0 (with subjective counterparts ^ E1 [￿2] and
^ V ar1 [￿2]).
The ￿rst subsection shows that there is a natural human tendency towards optimism in
planning situations and that this optimism causes the planning fallacy: a person￿ s average
felicity is increased by a small amount of optimism and is maximized by optimistic beliefs.
Further, it is optimal for a person to be overcon￿dent. A second subsection presents the basic
experimental evidence on the planning fallacy and summarizes the evidence that we use in the
balance of the paper to test our theory.
3.1 Optimal beliefs and behavior
Given beliefs, the person chooses w1 to maximize the expected present discounted value of the
utility ￿ ow, ^ E1 [V1], where
V1 := u(w1) + u(w2),
and w2 = maxf￿1 + ￿2 ￿ w1;0g. Because utility is concave, people want to smooth work across
periods. By certainty equivalence, only the subjective mean matters for behavior. Thus since
people do not discount the future and there is no cost to doing the task later, people do half the
work they expect in the ￿rst period.
Proposition 1 (Optimal work given beliefs)




￿1 + ^ E1 [￿2]
￿
.
In particular, a person with objective beliefs (rational expectations) chooses wRE
1 = ￿1.
Our ￿rst main result is that a small degree of optimistic misplanning is in fact better than
objective planning. This result establishes that with anticipatory utility, rational expectations
are suboptimal.
Proposition 2 (A small amount of the planning fallacy is bene￿cial)
A small degree of optimism increases a person￿ s expected well-being and decreases work in the ￿rst
period: for a marginal decrease in ^ E1 [￿2], dW
d ^ E1[￿2]j ^ E1[￿2]=E1[￿2] < 0 and
dw￿
1
d ^ E1[￿2]j ^ E1[￿2]=E1[￿2] > 0.
9Two other points on well-being deserve mentioning. First, we use the objective expectations operator to
evaluate well-being because we are interested in maximizing the happiness of the person on average, across
realizations of uncertainty. The objective expectation captures this since the actual unfolding of uncertainty is
determined by objective probabilities rather than those probabilities that the agent believes. Second, our results
do not hinge upon our use of the simple average of felicities; signi￿cant generalizations are possible but at the
cost of signi￿cant complexity.
7The proof of this proposition comes directly from a comparison of the increase in the person￿ s
felicity in the ￿rst period, which bene￿ts from more optimistic anticipation, with the decrease
in the second period, which on average su⁄ers the costs of worse planning. A small amount
of optimism increases felicity in the ￿rst period ( ^ E1 [V1]) both through a lower level of work
e⁄ort and through a decrease in the expected disutility of the work in the second period. This
is a ￿rst-order increase in felicity. When ￿ = 1, average second-period felicity (E1 [V2]) declines
because the work is not perfectly smoothed over the two periods. But this is a second-order cost
since it is a small deviation from an action that sets a ￿rst-order condition equal to zero. Thus
well-being rises with a small amount of optimism. When ￿ < 1, felicity in the second period
places less weight on utility ￿ ow from the ￿rst period. Thus a small amount of optimism has
￿rst-order bene￿ts for felicity in both the ￿rst and second period. When ￿ < 1, the costs are
￿rst order, but still smaller than the ￿rst-order bene￿ts to some optimism.
Our second main result is that optimal beliefs and behavior are characterized by the planning
fallacy. Thus optimism and the planning fallacy are not only locally but also globally optimal.
Further, this situational theory of the planning fallacy generates testable predictions.
To reiterate, optimal beliefs maximize well-being, equation (3), given optimal behavior given
beliefs, Proposition (1) and equation (1). We denote optimal beliefs by ^ E￿￿
1 [￿2] and ^ V ar￿￿
1 [￿2]
and the optimal work they induce as w￿￿
1 and w￿￿
2 .
Proposition 3 (The planning fallacy is optimal)
The agent with optimal beliefs exhibits the planning fallacy:
(i) ^ E￿￿
1 [￿2] = 1￿￿




People initially underestimate the amount of work that the project will require and so do less
than half the total work in the ￿rst period, on average. They gain the bene￿ts of doing little
work in the ￿rst period and expecting little work in the second. They lose some of the bene￿ts
of optimally smoothing e⁄ort and on average su⁄er in the second period when they have more
work to do than expected. In general, our ￿ economic￿model predicts the planning fallacy is
greater, the greater the anticipatory bene￿ts of optimism and the smaller the ex post costs of
misplanning.
According to our theory, people at some subconscious level know the objective distribution,
but choose to be optimistic anyway. This description of the planning fallacy is strikingly similar
to the original description of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), quoted at the beginning of the
paper.10
To conclude this section, we show that, according to our theory, not only should mean beliefs
be optimistic, but also people should be overcon￿dent about the precision of their predictions.
That is, in a similar sense as for optimism, our model implies that it would be surprising if
people did not exhibit some overcon￿dence in their predictions.
Proposition 4 (A small amount of overcon￿dence is bene￿cial; complete overcon￿dence is op-
timal)
10In this quote, one can interpret the E1 [￿2] and V ar1 [￿2] as objective learned probabilities given past realized
sample values rather than parameters of the true distribution.
8(i) From objective beliefs, a small decrease in the perceived uncertainty about future work in-
creases a person￿ s well-being: dW
d^ V ar1[￿2]j^ V ar1[￿2]=V ar1[￿2] < 0;
(ii) A person￿ s well-being is maximized by the belief that he knows what work level will be required:
^ V ar￿￿
1 [￿2] = 0 < V ar1 [￿2].
Certainty-equivalence implies that overcon￿dence has no behavioral consequences. On the
other hand, since utility is concave, overcon￿dence does have anticipatory bene￿ts. Thus the
optimal perceived uncertainty is the corner solution of certainty. Our result is extreme because
utility is quadratic. But some overcon￿dence is optimal for a wider range of utility functions.11
Even in its extremity, this prediction again closely matches the initial psychological inter-
pretation of the planning fallacy by Kahneman and Tversky. They theorize that people focus
on a single plausible scenario for completing the task and ignore uncertainty:
The planning fallacy is a consequence of the tendency to neglect distributional data
and to adopt what may be termed an internal approach to prediction, in which one
focuses on the constituents of the speci￿c problem rather than on the distributional
outcomes in similar cases. ￿Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
While in theory, a reduction in the subjective variance is distinct from a reduction in the
subjective mean, in practice experimental evidence sometimes blurs this di⁄erence because of
the di¢ culty in eliciting distributional information. The bias in mean explains both main exper-
imental ￿ndings: (i) overcon￿dence about how often the task will be completed by the predicted
completion date, and (ii) underestimation of task completion times on average. The bias in
variance makes overcon￿dence more extreme. In any case, our model delivers both biases.
In Appendix A, we show three comparative statics results. The planning fallacy is worse
the more important memory utility is, because fond memory of little work in the past lasts.
The planning fallacy is worse the lower the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is, because
curvature in the utility function increases the costs of misallocation of work over time.12 Finally,
the planning fallacy is worse the less impatient the agent is, because impatience decreases the
importance of anticipatory utility.
3.2 Basic experimental evidence on the planning fallacy
This subsection describes two speci￿c experiments showing the existence of the planning fallacy
and then summarizes the set of experimental results that are the basis for the testing of the
model in Section 5. The ￿rst speci￿c experiment demonstrates that people tend to underestimate
the amount of time it will take them to complete a task. The second shows that people whose
e⁄ort is forcibly smoothed over time perform better than people simply making decisions based
on their own beliefs.
11For any utility function there must be su¢ cient curvature in utility relative to marginal utility. The more
curved utility is, the larger is the direct increase in well-being for any reduction in variance of future outcomes.
The less curved marginal utility is, the smaller the behavioral response to the decrease in uncertainty, from the
￿ precautionary￿channel, and therefore the smaller the indirect decrease in well-being is from changed behavior.





t, so that the IES is given by
a+w
w .
9First, Buehler, Gri¢ n, and Ross (1994) report the results of the following experiment (study
2). In the experiment, over 100 undergraduate psychology students ￿lled out a questionnaire
asking them to describe an academic task and a non-academic task that they intended to com-
plete in the upcoming week, to predict the amount of time that it would take them to complete
each task, and to report how con￿dent they were that they would indeed complete each task by
the predicted time. Actual completion times were collected using a follow-up questionnaire one
week later and telephone interviews at the end of the semester. For academic (non-academic)
tasks, the average subject expected to complete his task in 5.8 (5.0) days and actually com-
pleted the task in 10.7 (9.2) days. Only 37 (43) percent of subjects completed their academic
(non-academic) tasks in the time they predicted, while they reported that they were 74 (70)
percent certain that they would do so.
Importantly, to encourage accuracy in prediction, prior to the experiment, half of the subjects
were primed by being told that the purpose of the study was to assess the accuracy of people￿ s
predictions. But these subjects exhibited just as optimistic predictions as the other half of the
subjects on average.13
Second, Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002) report the results of the following experiment (study
2) on the temporal allocation of work. In the experiment, 60 MIT students were paid for the
quality and timeliness of three proofreading exercises over a three-week period. Half of the
subjects were assigned deadlines that required completion of one exercise per week, the other
half simply had a terminal deadline at the end of the three weeks for all three exercises. The
former group completed their work more evenly over the three weeks, detected more errors, and
earned more money in the experiment (even taking into account losses due to missed deadlines).
Thus optimistic beliefs go hand in hand with delay that leads to poorer outcomes.14
Many experiments have con￿rmed these central tendencies ￿ optimistic prediction error
and subsequent misallocation of e⁄ort ￿and also documented a set of stylized facts about the
planning fallacy. These experiments show that the planning fallacy is not a ￿xed bias, but
is situational. Following our treatment of deadlines in Section 4, we use these experiments in
Section 5 to test our model. A very brief summary of the ￿ndings of these experiments are:
1. Reported beliefs about task completion times are correlated with actual completion times
both across subjects within an experiment and across experiments (see Section 5.1).
2. Many, but not all, di⁄erent framings and manipulations of the environment that are not
payo⁄-relevant do not eliminate misestimation of task completion times or delay of work
(see Section 5.2).
3. The misestimation of task completion times is much less severe or absent in short, in-
laboratory experiments (see Section 5.3).
13If instead of framing one actually bases rewards on the accuracy of prediction, then, as we show in section
5.5, our model predicts that the planning fallacy should be mitigated. Buehler, Gri¢ n, and MacDonald (1997)
(study 2) ￿nd that payment for accuracy eliminates the planning fallacy.
14We note however that Buehler, Gri¢ n, and Ross (1994) in experiment 5 show a ￿nding not consistent with
this link. A framing manipulation that generates more accurate prediction actually slightly increases time to
completion. See Section 5.5.
104. When people are paid for rapid task completion, the misestimation of task completion
times is more severe and work is completed sooner (see Section 5.4).
5. When people are paid for accurate prediction of task completion times, the misestimation
of task completion times is less severe and delay of work is similar (see Section 5.5).
We now return to our general model in which people can impose intermediate deadlines.
4 Deadlines
In this section we show that our theory predicts that people choose to impose binding interme-
diate deadlines, that these deadlines improve the temporal allocation of work, and that they do
not require perfect intertemporal smoothing of work. The extant experimental evidence matches
each of these predictions.
4.1 Optimal beliefs and behavior
Prior to observing ￿1 and choosing w1, the person chooses ￿ to maximize the expected present
discounted value of the utility ￿ ow, ^ E [V1], taking into account how w1 will be chosen as a
function of ￿1. At this point, the person wants to smooth work e⁄ort according to his prior
beliefs, so that he would like w1 (￿1) = 1
2
￿
￿1 + ^ E [￿2j￿1]
￿
. If this amount is more than he
expects to do absent a deadline, which is the case if ^ E [￿2j￿1] > ^ E1 [￿2j￿1], then he has a time
consistency problem stemming from changing beliefs. In this case, if he has the ability to commit
to an intermediate deadline, then he will choose a binding intermediate deadline that commits
himself to what he believes to be perfect smoothing ￿that is, to doing in period 1 half of the
total work he currently expects.15
We now consider optimal beliefs. Both prior and period-one subjective beliefs are set to
maximize well-being, given the choices of deadline and work that these beliefs induce. We
begin by considering the situation in which the person chooses his own intermediate deadline
to maximize his felicity, and then contrast this to the situation in which an outsider imposes a
deadline to maximize the objective expectation of the disutility of work. Finally, we compare
both situations to the situation with no deadline studied in Section 3.
First, consider letting the person choose the deadline. After ￿1 is realized, if the deadline
does not bind, then optimal beliefs and behavior match those of the situation with no deadline.
If the deadline binds, then w1 = ￿￿1 and optimal beliefs are completely optimistic, ^ E1 [￿2] = 0.
Thus a binding deadline can lead to better smoothing of work e⁄ort and higher anticipatory
utility. Both of these e⁄ects increase well-being, thus it is optimal for the agent to impose a
binding deadline.16 Moving back to prior beliefs, in order to induce the person to impose a
15Subsequently, we show that optimal beliefs, ^ E
￿￿ [￿2j￿1] and ^ E
￿￿
1 [￿2j￿1], are linear in ￿1. In this case, if
^ E
￿￿ [￿2j￿1] > ^ E
￿￿
1 [￿2j￿1], the optimal deadline is ￿






=￿1. If ^ E
￿￿ [￿2j￿1] < ^ E
￿￿
1 [￿2j￿1], then
the agent chooses a non-binding deadline. If beliefs are objective, the person is indi⁄erent between all deadlines
￿ 2 [0;1] since he knows that in period 1 he will choose the optimal amount of work anyway.
16We will show that, since the problem scales in ￿1, the deadline either binds or does not for all realizations of
￿1.
11binding deadline, he must believe that, absent a deadline, he will do insu¢ cient work in period
1. Thus to induce a deadline, the person must hold more realistic beliefs about ￿2 before
observing ￿1 than after. In sum, the person is initially somewhat more realistic and chooses a
binding deadline, understanding that without it he would do less work when the time comes.
Subsequently, the person is forced by the deadline to better smooth work e⁄ort while at the
same time he becomes more optimistic about the amount of work required in the future.
Second, consider, an outsider choosing a deadline to maximize the objective expectation of
the ￿ ow disutility of work, E [V1]. Clearly, the outsider imposes a deadline that requires perfect
smoothing of work e⁄ort on average. Formally, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 5 (Self-imposed and externally-imposed deadlines)
(i) With no deadline (￿ = 0), the person is optimistic, is overcon￿dent, and postpones work in
period 1;
(ii) With a self-imposed deadline, the person initially believes
^ E￿￿[ ^ E￿￿[￿2j￿1]￿1]






= 0), imposes a binding deadline, and is more optimistic and postpones less work
in period 1 than in case (i);
(iii) With an externally-imposed deadline, the deadline is stricter than in case (ii), the person
is equally optimistic in period 1, but he does not postpone work.
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The central result of part (ii), that it is optimal to choose a deadline that will later bind,
stems from an inconsistency in beliefs. The person choosing a deadline thinks that, absent a
deadline, in the future he would choose to work too little. This behavior occurs because his prior
conditional expectations, ^ E￿￿ [￿2j￿1], exceed ^ E￿￿
1 [￿2j￿1] = 0, his expectations after observing ￿1.
He may or may not consciously understand that becoming more optimistic about the ease of
the task is the cause of his procrastination. Nevertheless, it is this belief inconsistency, and
the agent￿ s awareness of the resulting behavior, that leads to his willingness to overcome his
procrastination by setting a binding deadline for himself.
The novelty of our results relative to extant economic theories of procrastination is that the
desire for commitment arises from changing beliefs over time rather than preference inconsis-
tency.17 Importantly, our result provides a prediction for behavior that di⁄ers from that of a
preference-based theory in which people are sophisticated. In the latter, a person would choose
17See Strotz (1955-1956) for a general form of preference inconsistency; Phelps and Pollak (1968) and Laibson
12a deadline that matches the deadline chosen by an objective outside observer while in our theory
the person chooses a less strict deadline (provided ￿ > 0). The next subsection discusses the
experimental evidence on this point. Second, in existing models, the desire for commitment is
only as strong as the preference inconsistency, while in our setting an arbitrarily small amount
of belief inconsistency can lead to a desire to commit to a signi￿cantly di⁄erent action. That is,
while belief inconsistency is necessary in our setting for the agent to recognize procrastination
as a self-control problem, an arbitrarily small amount can signi￿cantly alter behavior. To see
this, note that unconditional beliefs in period 0 are not determined uniquely; ^ E [￿2j￿1] can be
arbitrarily small, and therefore arbitrarily close to being consistent with ^ E￿￿
1 [￿2j￿1] = 0.
Turning to part (iii) of Proposition 5, an outsider with rational beliefs chooses a stricter
deadline than the agent would commit himself to, because the rational outsider ignores the
bene￿cial e⁄ects of belief distortion, and therefore is only interested in smoothing work e⁄ort.
An outside observer interested in well-being rather than the smoothing of work e⁄ort would
choose the same deadline as the person himself would.
In the next subsection we present the experimental evidence on the choice of deadlines.
These experiments also include information on task performance. While we have interpreted
our model as one in which the task is always completed with the same performance, a reasonable
interpretation of our model is that one of the costs of poor smoothing is lower task performance
(rather than a utility cost alone). That is, the higher the quantity of work done in a period, the
lower the quality of the work performed in that period. Similarly, if a large amount of work is
left for period 2, a person might actually be late in completing the project and su⁄er penalties









so that the smoother the mathematical expectation of the work pro￿le, the higher the average
ex post performance.18
Since w￿￿
1 with no deadline is less than w￿￿
1 with a self-imposed deadline, which is less than
w￿￿
1 that optimally smooths work over time, we have the following corollary to Proposition 5.
Corollary 1 (Task Performance)
(i) Self-imposed deadlines improve task performance, but do not maximize task performance
unless ￿ = 0;
(ii) Externally-imposed deadlines maximize task performance.
4.2 Experimental evidence on intermediate deadlines
First, there is substantial evidence of inconsistency in updating beliefs. For example, Gilovich,
Kerr, and Medvec (1993) reports that people￿ s average beliefs about exam performance change
with temporal distance from the exam, both before and after (prior to receiving a grade).
(1997) for quasi-hyperbolic discounting; Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) for temptation preferences; Loewenstein,
O￿ Donoghue, and Rabin (2003) for projection bias about future utility; and BØnabou and Tirole (2004) for a
model in which imperfect recall generates time-inconsistent beliefs.
18It is straightforward to analyze task performance in a model in which the agent also cares about his future
performance and derives anticipatory utility from it. Indeed, under some assumptions such a model is isomorphic
to our model.
13Second, there is substantial evidence ￿formal and informal ￿that people choose deadlines to
constrain their future behavior. Informally, there are institutional arrangements such as weight-
loss camps, alcohol clinics, and Christmas clubs that people seem to use as commitment devices.
Formally, Wertenbroch (1998), Fishbach and Trope (2000), and DellaVigna and Malmendier
(2006) all document that people choose to constrain their future behavior.19
Most directly related to our model are the experiments of Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002)
which studies deadlines in the context of academic tasks. The authors conducted two separate
studies: one in which subjects had to write three papers during the course of the term for an
executive education class, and one in which subjects had to proof-read three texts in the course
of three weeks. Subjects were divided into three groups: one that faced externally-imposed,
equally-spaced deadlines; one in which subjects could self-impose deadlines; and one that had
no deadline option (the last treatment only existed in the proofreading study).
This experimental design closely resembles our theoretical setup. We can interpret ￿1 and
￿2 as two papers/proofreading exercises (where the experiment has three), and the assumption
E [￿2j￿1] = ￿1 has the interpretation that by completing (at least part of) the ￿rst paper, subjects
learn the expected di¢ culty of the second. In our model, a deadline imposes the fraction of the
￿rst project completed at the end of period 1, while in the Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002)
experiments it is the date at which one has to complete ￿1.
In terms of deadlines, the authors ￿nd ￿rst that most people given the option to choose a
deadline do choose one. For the paper assignments, the average deadlines chosen were 42 days
before the end of the semester for the ￿rst paper, 26 days for the second, and 10 days for the
third. 73% of deadlines were prior to the last week of class. Second, the chosen deadlines are on
average signi￿cantly earlier than the average completion time of the group without deadlines,
and signi￿cantly later than the exogenously imposed equally-spaced deadlines. This pattern
exactly mirrors our results in Proposition 5, 1 ￿ 3
3+￿ > 2
3+￿.
In terms of performance, Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002) ￿nds that subjects given an externally-
imposed (equally-spaced) deadline performed better (as measured by the course grade in the
￿rst study and by the number of errors detected in the second study) than subjects that self-
imposed a deadline. In the proof-reading assignment, the group who had the option to impose
a deadline in turn performed better than subjects who had no deadline.20 Again, this pattern
exactly mirrors our results in Proposition 5 and Corollary 1, ￿1 ￿ 3
3+￿￿1 > 2
3+￿￿1.
These experimental results are not due to endogeneity such as the possibility that good
students select deadlines and also have better performance. First, students were randomly as-
19Wertenbroch (1998) reports on an experiment studying the purchasing choices of MBA students across dif-
ferent quantity discounts and goods, as well as on a study of supermarket scanner data on quantity discounts
and relative demands. The experiment ￿nds that people tend to purchase goods perceived as more vice-like in
smaller quantities despite volume discounts relative to less vice-like goods (e.g. regular vs. low-fat Oreo cookies).
Further, more vice-like food items show steeper price declines with volume in the supermarket data. These results
suggest that people are inclined to buy smaller quantities of items that they think they might overconsume in
the future. Fishbach and Trope (2000) ￿nd that participants self-impose penalties for (intentionally) neglecting
to undergo minor medical procedures, and that the magnitude of these penalties is correlated with the severity
of the procedure. Finally, DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006) document that a sample of gym users would have
saved almost ￿fty percent if they had bought daily passes instead of gym memberships.
20Consistent with our mapping between model and experiment, this performance pattern includes penalties for
missing deadlines and the ￿nal ￿ due date.￿
14signed to treatment groups in the proofreading study.21 Second, in the proofreading study, some
students self-imposed equally-spaced deadlines. If they were better-than-average proofreaders,
then they should have outperformed the random sample of subjects with externally-imposed
equally-spaced deadlines. But they did not ￿their performance was similar. However, they did
outperform the remaining subjects choosing their own deadlines. This evidence suggests that
even within the group with self-imposed deadlines, choosing a tighter deadline leads to better
performance.22
Grove and Wasserman (2006) also corroborates that externally-imposed deadlines improve
performance, based on evidence from a natural experiment that occurred in an undergraduate
course at Syracuse University in 1998. Two professors were to each teach one section of the
same course with the same problem sets with the same deadlines. One professor would factor
problem set performance into course grades, while the other would not. Unexpectedly, one
professor started the semester ill, and the other professor started teaching both sections but with
this di⁄erence in requirements. The ill professor was unable to return, so the same professor
taught both classes. Since it was deemed inappropriate to change grading procedures, a natural
experiment arose: there were two groups of students participating in a course with the same
professor, exams, etc., but facing di⁄erent consequences for late or incomplete problem sets.
Students for whom problem sets were graded ￿a condition interpretable as having a deadline ￿
did on average one-third of a letter grade better in the course exams than students for whom
problem sets were not graded.23
As a ￿nal caveat, note that though deadlines improve performance on the task to which they
apply, it is possible that they decrease performance on other tasks, so that deadlines may or
may not be good overall.
We now return to using experimental variation in environment to test the predictions of our
model of the planning fallacy absent deadlines against observed variation in beliefs and behavior.
5 Tests using experimental variation in beliefs and behavior
We further test our theory of the planning fallacy (without intermediate deadlines) using ￿ve
pieces of evidence from extant experiments without deadlines. Employing our model from Sec-
tion (3), so there is no choice of deadline and ￿1 is non-stochastic, we consider: (i) the infor-
mativeness of beliefs; (ii) the e⁄ects of debiasing; (iii) the di⁄erential ￿ndings in laboratory
versus ￿eld experiments; (iv) the e⁄ects of monetary incentives for rapid completion; and (v)
the e⁄ects of monetary incentives for accurate prediction. This section also demonstrates that
reported beliefs are informative because the observed variation is explained by the variation in
21In the paper-writing study, there were two sections of the class; one of them was randomly assigned to one
treatment and the other section was assigned to the other treatment.
22In the context of our model, heterogeneity in the choice of deadline can come from heterogeneity in ￿. Those
with ￿ = 0 choose equally-spaced deadlines.
23We interpret these results as informative about exogenously imposed deadlines, but it may instead support
our predictions about self-imposed deadlines. That is, in contrast to the Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002) study,
in this experiment it is possible for students to choose which section to enroll in. Thus, students who desire
commitment can choose to enroll in the course with graded problem sets rather than the section without. In
either interpretation, the prediction of our model matches the ￿nding.
15costs and bene￿ts of optimistic versus realistic beliefs according to our theory.
5.1 The situational nature of beliefs
Absent deadlines, our model predicts that, despite the overoptimism and overcon￿dence biases,
predicted and actual completion times should be closely related.
Proposition 6 Optimal expected total work, ^ E￿￿
1 [￿1 + ￿2], is positively correlated with actual
total work across tasks with di⁄erent objectively expected work, E1 [￿1 + ￿2]:
d ^ E￿￿
1 [￿1 + ￿2]
dE1 [￿1 + ￿2]
> 0.
Experiments ￿nd large positive correlations between predicted completion times and actual
completion times both across experimental settings and across participants within given exper-
iments.
Across experiments, Roy, Christenfeld, and McKenzie (2005) surveys the results from a large
number of experiments dealing with the planning fallacy and shows that predictions relate to
actual completion times. Among the eight studies listed in Table 1 of their paper with actual
completion times in days (ranging from 1:9 days to 55:5 days), the correlation between the
average predicted completion time and the average actual completion time is 0:97. All eight
studies ￿nd the planning fallacy: the mean prediction is 4:7 days or 26 percent less than the
mean actual completion time.24
Across people, Buehler, Gri¢ n, and Ross (1994) ￿nd the following correlations in their
studies. In study 1, the correlation of subjects￿predicted completion times and their actual
completion times for the completion of their senior thesis is 0:77. This is despite signi￿cant bias:
the mean predicted time to completion is 33:9 days, 21:7 days shorter than the mean actual
completion time. In study 2 (described in the introduction), the correlation is 0:77 for academic
tasks and 0:45 for nonacademic tasks. In study 3, dealing with school projects that subjects
expected to complete within 2 weeks, the correlation is 0:81.
Strikingly, the informativeness of beliefs is similar to that found in experiments in which
manipulations eliminate the planning fallacy. Thus reported beliefs are not biased due to a
lack of subconscious understanding of the objective situation. As in our model, beliefs are
biased, but closely related to the true probabilities. In study 4 of Buehler, Gri¢ n, and Ross
(1994), subjects were asked to recall and report past experiences with expected and actual
completion times for similar assignments in doing a computer project due in 1 or 2 weeks (￿ recall￿
manipulation). Interestingly, a random subset of subjects were also asked the following two
questions immediately prior to predicting their completion time: 1) when they would complete
the task if it was typical of past similar tasks, and 2) to describe a plausible scenario based on
24In the four studies with single-day actual completion times, the correlation is 85 percent, and the mean bias
26 percent. In the four studies with double-day actual completion times, the correlation is 96 percent, and the
mean bias 26 percent. We omit one study in which the completion times of others are predicted, and a number
of studies for which the only reported statistics are in terms of predicted and actual time before deadline rather
than time to completion. The remaining studies are in terms of minutes or hours and are mostly laboratory
experiments, which we discuss in Section 5.3.
16past experiences for completion at the typical time (￿ relevant￿manipulation). Subjects receiving
the ￿ relevant￿treatment exhibited no planning fallacy: the mean predicted and actual times
to completion were the same (both 7:0 days).25 Yet the correlation of the ￿ relevant￿group￿ s
predicted and actual completion times (0:75) was similar to those in the other experiments, and
only slightly (and statistically insigni￿cantly) higher than the correlation for the ￿ recall￿group
(0:66) which exhibited the planning fallacy.
5.2 Framing
Like in canonical economic theory, according to our theory framing and attempts at debiasing
should have little e⁄ect on observed beliefs and behavior. Our theory is a mapping from the
objective environment to subjective beliefs and behavior. And like neoclassical economics, we
take objective probabilities as primitives, independent of framing. That said, there is evidence
(mostly in psychology and marketing sciences) that framing sometimes can change behavior, par-
ticularly in laboratory experiments. One interpretation of the e⁄ect of framing is that frames
provide information about the objective probability distribution in the experiment. This idea
is not inconsistent with our theory if one considers the primitives as post-framing objective
probabilities. This said, we maintain the central assumption that objective probabilities are
invariant to framing for two reasons: First, in most experiments the tasks either are rehearsed
prior to prediction or are common tasks that subjects have experience with (as in school assign-
ments) so that subjects at some level have a good assessment of the true probabilities. Second,
we do not have a theory or understanding of when and how frames change people￿ s perhaps
unconscious understanding of the truth. Thus our theory predicts that framing should not
eliminate the planning fallacy (provided that framing has little e⁄ect on the perceived objective
probabilities).
Many framing manipulations intended by experimenters to debias beliefs and change behav-
ior do not. Researchers have found a behaviorally and statistically signi￿cant planning fallacy
despite the following debiasing techniques: (i) allowing subjects to familiarize themselves with
the task at hand (most studies); (ii) asking subjects to describe multiple scenarios for task com-
pletion (Newby-Clark, Ross, Buehler, Koehler, and Gri¢ n (2000)); (iii) telling subjects that
the ￿primary purpose of the study was to assess the accuracy of people￿ s predictions￿(Buehler,
Gri¢ n, and Ross (1994), study 1); (iv) asking subjects to list relevant past experiences, such
as the distribution of completion times of similar tasks in the past (Buehler, Gri¢ n, and Ross
(1994), study 4 ￿ recall￿manipulation; Hinds (1999)); (v) asking subjects to list several reasons
for failure and several reasons for successful completion (Sanna and Schwarz (2004)); (vi) asking
subjects to list possible surprises that could lead to failure to meet expected completion time
(Byram (1997), experiment 1; Hinds (1999)); (vii) asking subjects to list the components of the
task (Byram (1997), study 1; Connolly and Dean (1997) ); (viii) use of anchoring and adjust-
ment (Byram (1997)); (ix) group prediction of the task completion time of a group (Buehler,
Messervey, and Gri¢ n (2005)).
However, the following variations that are not relevant for objective payo⁄s have been found
to largely eliminate the misestimation of task completion times: (i) asking subjects prior to
prediction to list past relevant experiences, then asking them when they would complete the
25The random subset of subjects asked just the ￿rst question still exhibited the planning fallacy.
17studied task if it was typical of these past tasks, and ￿nally asking them to describe a plausible
scenario for task completion (Buehler, Gri¢ n, and Ross (1994) study 4 ￿ relevant￿manipulation);
(ii) asking subjects to make concrete and detailed plans for completing the task (Koole and
Spijker (2000) ￿nd a decrease in predicted completion times but an even larger decrease in
actual completion times).
There are two other relevant experimental ￿ndings. First, it seems that the planning fallacy
is not cultural: it is also present in Japan and Canada (Buehler, Otsubo, Heine, Lehman, and
Gri¢ n (1998)). Second, evidence is mixed on whether the planning fallacy is found when subjects
predict the completion times of others. Buehler, Gri¢ n, and Ross (1994) (study 5) ￿nds that
subjects tend to overpredict the task completion times of others when they observe the others￿
descriptions of previous experiences (even though these others still underpredict their own task
completion dates after listing these experiences). Hinds (1999) ￿nds signi￿cant underprediction
when predicting the completion times of others who are novices, and that the bias is worse the
more experienced the predictor is in the task. Similarly, Byram (1997) (study 3) also ￿nds no
mitigation of the planning fallacy.
5.3 Non-onerous tasks
The experimental literature also ￿nds that the planning fallacy is mitigated and even occasionally
reversed in short laboratory experiments.
As an example, Burt and Kemp (1994) reports on an experiment in which subjects are asked
how long it will take them to do each of ￿ve tasks: buy a stamp, ￿nd a book in the library,
walk from one building to another, complete a one-page form, and sort a deck of cards. The
subjects were then timed undertaking the activities, returned to the laboratory, and were asked
more questions. Subjects on average overestimated the time it would take for four out of ￿ve
tasks. As another example, Buehler, Gri¢ n, and MacDonald (1997) (study 2) reports asking
subjects how long it will take them to solve an anagram. Subjects (with no other incentives)
on average predicted it would take 6:3 minutes when the average completion time ex post was
a statistically indistinguishable 6:4 minutes. Byram (1997) (study 5) reports the results of a
laboratory experiment in which subjects fold origami. Average predicted time to completion
(with no other incentives) was 10:1 minutes, while average actual time to completion was 9:8
minutes. Median predicted time was 7:8 minutes compared to median actual time of 8:8 minutes.
These ￿ndings are consistent with our theory if the time spent in these experiments not doing
the task is no less onerous than the time spent in these experiments doing the task. It seems
unlikely that sitting in a laboratory waiting for other people to solve their anagrams or get back
from buying their stamps provides more utility than actually participating in the activities of
the experiment oneself.
Formally, consider a situation where disutility comes from the amount of time spent at an
experiment in each period, ￿t, and not the time spent working on the activity of the experiment.
Suppose further that the time a person spends at an experiment does not depend on his w
(or ￿2). Then a person￿ s felicity and wellbeing are independent of his beliefs about ￿2, and




1 [￿2] = E1 [￿2] = ￿1 and ^ V ar￿￿
1 [￿2] = V ar1 [￿2] maximize wellbeing and w￿￿
1 = wRE
1 = ￿1.26
26Note that since well-being is independent of the smoothing of work, any beliefs about ￿2 actually maximize
18Thus in sum, if felicity and well-being do not depend on w, then our model predicts no
planning fallacy; if felicity and well-being actually increase in w ￿ some experiments study
activities that are fun rather than onerous ￿then our model can predict overestimation of task
completion times.
An alternative interpretation of the empirical evidence is that the failure of the planning
fallacy is due to the short duration of in-laboratory experiments rather than to the fact that
they take place in the laboratory. According to this alternative, people underestimate the time
involved in tasks that end up being shorter than the average task, as a rational Bayesian might.
The evidence however suggests that there is at least more going on than this. Many of the tasks
are either common tasks (such as buying a stamp) or actually rehearsed prior to prediction (as
in the anagrams experiment in Buehler, Gri¢ n, and MacDonald (1997)).27
We provide two pieces of evidence that the lack of anticipatory bene￿t is why there is no
planning fallacy found for in-laboratory experiments. To clearly test our model, we would like a
short laboratory experiment in which each person can leave when he completes his task and in
which the task is clearly unpleasant. Our ￿rst piece of evidence, study 1 in Byram (1997), has
these features, but pertains to a slightly longer task than the brief ones just cited.28 In the study,
subjects were asked how long they thought it would take them to build a computer stand. Six
months later, a random subsample were asked to predict completion times again, and then to
actually build the stand in the laboratory. Prior to each prediction, people were told to read the
assembly instructions. Subjects strongly exhibited the planning fallacy. The average predicted
completion time was 65:7 minutes six months before (and with only a possibility rather than a
certainty of having to build the stand), and was 48:2 minutes right before building the stand.
The average actual completion time was 76:1 minutes.
Our second piece of evidence is presented in the next subsection. In a laboratory experiment
dealing with a brief task, a control group does not exhibit the planning fallacy. However, a
treatment group that receives a payment for rapidly completing the task su⁄ers from the planning
fallacy. Thus even in a short experiment, when there is anticipatory bene￿t to believing that
one will ￿nish quickly, people exhibit the planning fallacy.
5.4 Incentives for speed
Byram (1997) (experiment 5) and Buehler, Gri¢ n, and MacDonald (1997) (study 2) report
the results of experiments in which subjects are randomly assigned to a treatment giving them
payment for rapid completion of the task.
In the context of our theory, this is a payment that is decreasing in work in the second
period, which we model formally as: P ￿ cw2 where P > 0 and c > 0. Thus in this treatment,
felicity in the ￿rst period is given by the current level of work e⁄ort and the anticipation of both
well-being. In this case it seems reasonable to choose that beliefs be rational, but according to our theory, they
need not be. Given this indeterminacy, we would expect framing and other utility concerns to have much greater
ability to manipulate beliefs in in-laboratory experiments.
27It is possible to combine both theories. Optimal beliefs would lead to an underestimation bias from the
baseline Bayesian overestimation of task completion times.
28We infer that each person could leave when ￿nished because ￿each subject was tested individually￿ when
actually building the computer stand.
19future work e⁄ort and the payment:
^ E1 [V1] = u(w1) + ^ E1 [u(w2) + (P ￿ cw2)]:
Felicity in the second period is given by realized outcomes:
V2 = ￿u(w1) + u(w2) + (P ￿ cw2):
Well-being continues to be the simple average of both felicities.
To keep the problem such that the person with objective beliefs chooses wRE
1 ￿ ￿1 despite
the incentive for rapid completion, we assume E [￿2] = ￿￿1 where 0 < ￿ < 1 and consider small
c (c < (1 ￿ ￿)￿1). The additional penalty for low work levels in the ￿rst period implies that it




￿1 + ^ E1 [￿2] + c
￿
But the additional cost of leaving work to the future implies there is an additional incentive to
believe that there will be little work to do in the future. Thus there is also a tendency to be more
optimistic and misplan by more. In sum, incentives for rapid completion increase misplanning
and increase the di⁄erence in initial e⁄ort between an agent with objective beliefs and the agent
with optimal expectations.













Experiments ￿nd that the planning fallacy worsens with incentives for speed.
In Byram (1997) (experiment 5), subjects were given folding instructions for origami and
asked to make predictions about their median time to completion.29 Then they were given the
materials for the origami ￿gure and then asked to complete it. A randomly selected treatment
group was also given explicit incentives for rapid completion prior to making their predictions.
Subjects were paid $4 for ￿nishing in the top quartile, $2 for ￿nishing in the next quartile, $1
for ￿nishing in the second quartile, and nothing for ￿nishing in the bottom quartile. The control
group was paid $3.
For the control group the median prediction time was 7.8 minutes and the median actual time
was 8.8 minutes, and for the treatment group the median prediction time was 5.0 minutes and
the median actual time was 7.8 minutes. Thus the incentive for speed raised the prediction error
by 180 percent and decreased the actual time to completion by 11 percent. Average prediction
and actual completion times also imply that the incentive worsened the prediction error, but
using averages the control group exhibited no planning fallacy and the incentives did not increase
average actual completion time.
Buehler, Gri¢ n, and MacDonald (1997) (study 1) reports the results of telephone surveys
of household expectations and actual behavior about tax ￿ling. The study ￿nds that people
who expected a refund, and therefore had a monetary incentive to ￿nish their returns earlier,
29A best guess described as ￿half the time will be faster and half the time will be slower.￿
20expected to ￿nish their returns on average 12 days before they actually did, while people who
expected to owe taxes expected to ￿nish their returns on average only 4 days before they actually
did. In the end, the average ￿ling times of both groups were almost the same ￿the di⁄erence
was a statistically insigni￿cant 3 days.
Since refund status is potentially endogenous, in study 2, Buehler, Gri¢ n, and MacDonald
(1997) study a laboratory experiment in which subjects complete anagram puzzles. In ￿ndings
similar to Byram (1997), a randomly-selected treatment group that is given payment for rapid
completion shows greater bias in prediction and more rapid completion of the anagrams.
5.5 Incentives for accuracy of beliefs
Buehler, Gri¢ n, and MacDonald (1997) (study 2) also report the results of an experiment
in which subjects are randomly assigned to a treatment giving them payment for accurate
prediction of task completion times.
In the context of our theory, this is a payment that is decreasing in the error in predicting
the total work involved in a project, which we model formally as: P ￿ k
￿
^ E1 [￿2] ￿ ￿2
￿2
where
P > 0 and k > 0. Thus in this experiment, felicity in the ￿rst period is given by the current
level of work e⁄ort and the anticipation of both future work e⁄ort and the payment:






^ E1 [￿2] ￿ ￿2
￿2￿￿
In the second period felicity is given by realized outcomes:




^ E1 [￿2] ￿ ￿2
￿2￿
:
Well-being continues to be the simple average of both felicities.
Since the payment is based only on beliefs (and ￿2), there is no e⁄ect on behavior given
beliefs. But on average the ex post loss associated with incorrect prediction gives an additional
cost to overly optimistic beliefs, and thus beliefs are more objective.













Again, the experiment con￿rms this prediction for the pattern of beliefs. However, there is
no evidence that the tasks are completed sooner.
Buehler, Gri¢ n, and MacDonald (1997) (study 2) report the results of an experiment on
prediction and task completion done on undergraduates. Subjects were given anagrams to
complete, and were asked to practice by doing two puzzles, each of which was observed to
take 5 to 7 minutes. Then all subjects were given an incentive for speed, as described in the
previous subsection.30 Next, a random subsample was given in addition an incentive for accurate
30They also report the results of this experiment on students who are not paid for rapid completion. We have
argued that there is little incentive to have the planning fallacy in this situation. In this case, the optimizing
agent should predict a long completion time and simply ￿nish slowly to meet his predicted completion time in
order to maximize his payment. The experiment ￿nds that indeed these incentives lead to longer prediction times
and longer actual time to completion, and even to overestimation of completion times.
21prediction: $2 if the predicted completion time was within 1 minute of the actual time and an
additional $2 if the predicted time was also within 30 seconds of the actual time. Then all
subjects were asked to predict their time to complete an anagram puzzle and ￿nally to actually
complete the anagram.
For students without the incentive for accurate prediction, the average predicted time to
completion was 4.1 minutes and the average actual time was 5.4 minutes, and for the treatment
group with the incentive the average predicted time was 5.8 minutes and the average actual
time was 5.5 minutes.31 Thus the incentive for accuracy decreased the bias in the expectation
of completion time so as to eliminate the planning fallacy. Our theory also predicts that the
incentive should reduce actual time to completion, but there is only a trivial di⁄erence in average
actual completion time.
6 Concluding discussion
In this paper, we develop an economic model of the planning fallacy based on the distortion
of subjective probabilities. As in the original description of the planning fallacy, people tend
to postpone work because they hold overoptimistic beliefs about the ease of the task at hand.
The strength of our approach is that these belief biases are situational, and so our model makes
predictions about when the planning fallacy is mitigated or exacerbated.
But like much recent work in behavioral economics, and unlike most textbook economics,
biases in beliefs are central to the understanding of behavior, and so our theory can be criticized
as a step away from the discipline of rationality that mainstream economics imposes on itself.
This discipline is used to select among models that can all explain observed choice behavior,
and rationality as the preferred assumption has its appeal in many contexts. But the appeal of
structural models is that they are useful out-of-sample, and a parsimonious model that better
represents actual beliefs and utilities is likely to perform better in such an exercise.
Thus we replace the discipline of the assumption of rationality with the discipline of data by
testing our model using reported beliefs. In doing so, we provide an example of how experimental
methods and reported expectations can be used to test and evaluate theoretical models that fall
under the broad heading of behavioral economics. That is, we subject the predictions of our
model to testing using subjective expectations reported in experimental and non-experimental
settings. In the experimental settings, we observe causation from environment to reported
beliefs that is consistent with our model and inconsistent with objective probability assessments.
Reported expectations respond to incentives in the ways predicted by our theory. In sum, the
model is consistent with much of the experimental evidence on both misplanning and on the use
and e⁄ects of deadlines.
31Values are estimates based on Figure 2, page 243.
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In this appendix we show three comparative statics results for the model with no deadline (Sec-
tion 3). First, the more important is memory utility, the worse is the planning fallacy, because
fond memory of little work in the past lasts. Second, the lower is the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution the worse is the planning fallacy, because curvature in the utility function increases
the costs of misallocation of work over time. Finally, the less impatient is the agent, the worse
is the planning fallacy, because impatience decreases the importance of anticipatory utility.
A.1 Memory
The continued enjoyment of past experiences or continued unhappiness from past su⁄ering,
is almost as central to the human experience as anticipating or dreading future events. The
planning fallacy relates to the strength of enjoyment of past memories because memory utility
reduces the costs of over-postponing work. The more a person dwells on the past, the greater
are the bene￿ts of optimism and little work in the ￿rst period. The utility bene￿ts of this
enjoyment last. Further, the strength of memory utility does not a⁄ect behavior given beliefs.
Thus memory utility increases the bene￿ts to optimistic beliefs.
Following the preceding logic, the more important memory utility, captured by our parameter
￿, the more severe the planning fallacy.
Proposition 9 (The planning fallacy and memory utility)










A formal proof follows directly from di⁄erentiation of the results in Proposition 3.
It is worth noting that even for ￿ = 0, when memory utility is weakest, people are still
optimistic and exhibit the planning fallacy. Thus memory utility increases the incentives to
engage in wishful thinking, but it is not necessary.
A.2 Intertemporal substitution
For our quadratic utility function, we can vary the importance of the curvature of the utility
function by introducing a linear disutility in e⁄ort term










27which is increasing in a at any work level.
From the agent￿ s perspective in the ￿rst-period, work is optimally smoothed so that one half
the expected work is done in the ￿rst period. Further, he believes that he faces no risk. Thus
curvature is irrelevant for the actions and felicity of the agent in the ￿rst period. Curvature
does however a⁄ect the realized utility in the second period, and therefore enters well-being and
in￿ uences beliefs. The less curved is utility, the less costly is not smoothing, and the worse is
the planning fallacy. Thus we have the following result.
Proposition 10 (The planning fallacy and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution)











To examine formally the role of impatience, we add a discount factor to preferences, ￿, so that
the person￿ s felicity in period 1 is
V1 := u(w1) + ￿u(w2)
where 0 < ￿ ￿ 1 (felicity in period 2 is unchanged because there is no future to discount). The
property that the behavior that maximizes ^ E1 [V1] is also the behavior that maximizes W under









(1 + ￿￿)u(w1) + ￿ ^ E1 [u(w2)] + ￿E [u(w2)]
￿
:
While we employ this de￿nition of well-being, we assume only that 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿1 so that
impatience can vary independently from the strength of memory utility and we do not confound
their e⁄ects. Finally, to ensure an interior optimum, we replace the assumption E [￿2j￿1] = ￿1
with E [￿2j￿1] = ￿￿1￿1.
We ￿rst state (without proof) that it can be shown that our previous results on optimism,
overcon￿dence and the planning fallacy continue to hold.
Turning to the e⁄ect of discounting, greater impatience (smaller ￿) implies that the bene￿ts
of optimism are lower since anticipatory utility is less important in ￿rst-period felicity. The
person who cares less about the future has less of an incentive to be optimistic about it.
Proposition 11 (Discounting)

















is not di⁄erentiable if ￿2 (1 ￿ ￿) = 1￿￿ but both left and right
derivatives satisfy the inequalities in the Proposition.
28B Proofs of propositions
As noted in the text, all propositions hold with probability one.
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1
First we show that the agent prefers to work amount ￿1 or less in the ￿rst period. If he chooses
to work amount ￿1 + " for any " ￿ 0, his felicity in period 1 is






























2d ^ F1 (￿2) + "2
Z ￿ ￿
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d ^ F1 (￿2) ￿ 2"
Z ￿ ￿
"
￿2d ^ F1 (￿2)
￿
Taking the di⁄erence between the felicity for w1 = ￿1 and w1 = ￿1+"1, where "1 > 0, we obtain
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Let c Pr1 (￿) represent the probabilities assigned by the subjective beliefs in period 1 conditional
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￿ "2 and ^ F1 (") ￿ 2 ￿ ^ F1 ("), hence the term "2
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￿ 0. Next, the assumption ^ E1 [￿2] ￿ ￿1 together with the identity ^ E1 [￿2] ￿
^ F1 (") ^ E1 [￿2j￿2 ￿ "]+
￿
1 ￿ ^ F1 (")
￿
^ E1 [￿2j￿2 > "] guarantee that the term ￿1￿
￿
1 ￿ ^ F1 (")
￿
^ E1 [￿2j￿2 > "] ￿
0. Thus, ^ E1 [V1]jw1=￿1 ￿ ^ E1 [V1]jw1=￿1+" ￿ 0. Inspection shows that at least one of the inequali-
ties used in the above argument must be strict, implying that ^ E1 [V1]jw1=￿1￿ ^ E1 [V1]jw1=￿1+" > 0.
Now we ￿nd the agent￿ s optimal work choice. Having shown that the agent optimally chooses
w1 ￿ ￿1, we can substituting the resource constraint (1) with equality into the objective, to get
max
w1
^ E1 [u(w1) + u(￿1 + ￿2 ￿ w1)]
which has ￿rst-order condition
u0 (w￿
1) = ^ E1
￿




29The certainty equivalence property of quadratic utility then implies that
w￿
1 = ^ E1 [￿1 + ￿2 ￿ w￿
1],
which reorganizes to our result. The second order condition is satis￿ed. It is easy to double-check
that indeed w￿
1 2 [0;￿1], since we have assumed 0 ￿ ^ E1 [￿2] ￿ E1 [￿2] and E1 [￿2] = ￿1.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Since we are considering a marginal decrease in ^ E1 [￿2] from E1 [￿2], we substitute the optimal
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￿
for ^ E1 [￿2] ￿ ￿1. Di⁄erentiating gives
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which evaluated at ^ E1 [￿2] = E1 [￿2] = ￿1 is
dW
d ^ E1 [￿2]
j ^ E1[￿2]=E1[￿2] = ￿
1
4
(1 + ￿)￿1 < 0.
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for ^ E1 [￿2] ￿ ￿1 so that
dw￿
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B.3 Proof of Proposition 3
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(1 ￿ ￿)￿1 ^ E1 [￿2]
￿
Taking the ￿rst order condition with respect to ^ E1 [￿2] and substituting E1 [￿2] = ￿1, we have







1 [￿2] = 1￿￿
3+￿￿1 < ￿1 = E1 [￿2].
Next, we show that ^ E1 [￿2] > ￿1 is never optimal. Intuitively, this is because pessimism both
worsens ex post smoothing of work e⁄ort and decreases anticipatory utility. We formally prove
this result here. In the proofs of the remainder propositions, we omit formal proof, but they are
analogous to the following.
We ￿rst rewrite the general wellbeing function as
W = 1
2E [u(w1) + u(w2)] + 1
2E [￿u(w1)] + 1
2 ^ E1 [u(w2)].
The ￿rst expectation is obviously maximized for behavior with objective beliefs and lower for
any other beliefs. The second expectation decreases in ^ E1 [￿2] since more pessimism increases
work in the ￿rst period.
Finally, we show the last expectation decreases in ^ E1 [￿2] for ^ E1 [￿2] > E [￿2]. To do so we
￿rst make use of the Euler equation to show that
w1 =
^ P1￿1 + ^ P1 ^ E1 [￿2jw2 > 0]
1 + ^ P1
,
where ^ P1 denotes the subjective probability that ￿1 + ￿2 ￿ w1 > 0 (i.e. that w2 > 0). Now
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2 + ^ V ar1 [￿2jw2 > 0] + ^ E1 [￿2jw2 > 0]
2 + 2 ^ E1 [￿2jw2 > 0](￿1 ￿ w1)
o
Given w1 and its determinants ￿ ^ P1 and ^ E1 [￿2jw2 > 0] ￿this term declines in ^ V ar1 [￿2jw2 > 0]
while the rest of W is independent of ^ V ar1 [￿2jw2 > 0]. Setting ^ V ar1 [￿2jw2 > 0] = 0, eliminating














1 + ^ P1
￿2
￿
￿1 + ^ E1 [￿2jw2 > 0]
￿2
which is maximized for ^ P1 = 0 (and decreasing in ^ E1 [￿2jw2 > 0] and ^ P1).
Thus, ^ E￿￿
1 [￿2] ￿ E1 [￿2].







1 < ￿1 = wRE.
31B.4 Proof of Proposition 4
(i) By Proposition 1, at objective beliefs the e⁄ort choice of the agent depends only on be-
liefs about means, not variances. Substituting the optimal actions from Proposition 1 into the
































The subjective variance of ￿2 after observing ￿1, ^ V ar1 [￿2], a⁄ects only the middle term of
this objective. By the concavity of the utility function, this term, and thus the objective, is
decreasing in ^ V ar1 [￿2]. Therefore, dW
d^ V ar1[￿2]j^ V ar1[￿2]=V ar1[￿2] < 0.
(ii) Clearly dW
d^ V ar1[￿2] < 0 for all values of ^ V ar1 [￿2] and ^ E1 [￿2] ￿ E1 [￿2], and so since
variances cannot be negative we have ^ V ar￿￿
1 [￿2] = 0.
B.5 Proof of Proposition 5
In this proposition we contrast the predictions of three variations of the model￿ s setup: (i) the
case where the person does not have the option to choose a deadline, (ii) the case where the
person self-imposes a deadline, and (iii) the case where the deadline is externally-imposed by
an objective observer. In each of these variations, the solution consists of ￿nding the optimal
actions w1 and w2, the optimal deadline ￿ (set to 0 in the case where choosing a deadline is
not an option), and the optimal beliefs, in particular, prior unconditional beliefs ^ E [￿t], ^ V ar[￿t],
for t = 1;2, and ^ Cov [￿1;￿2], prior conditional beliefs ^ E [￿2j￿1] and ^ V ar[￿2j￿1], and posterior
conditional beliefs ^ E1 [￿2] and ^ V ar1 [￿2].





￿1 + ^ E1 [￿2]
￿
and w￿
2 = ￿1 + ￿2 ￿ w￿
1. In what follows we look separately at the
three variations.
(i) In the variation of the model where the person does not have the option to choose a
deadline, optimal beliefs are given by Propositions 3 and 4 as ^ E￿￿
1 [￿2] = 1￿￿
3+￿￿1 and ^ V ar￿￿
1 [￿2] =
0. The choice of the other beliefs is arbitrary, since they do not a⁄ect well-being.
(ii) In the variation of the model where the person self-imposes a deadline, we need to ￿nd
the optimal deadline and optimal beliefs. Note that we are not interested in ￿nding the optimal
deadline for arbitrary beliefs, but rather the optimal deadline for the optimal beliefs, and so we
proceed as follows. In Step 1, we solve a modi￿ed problem, i.e., we ￿nd the actions w1 and w2,
and beliefs ^ E1 [￿2] and ^ V ar1 [￿2], that maximize the well-being, subject only to the primitive
constraints on their values, to the resource constraint that requires the task to be completed at
the end of the second period, and to the constraint that w1 ￿ ￿1. This is a less constrained
problem than the original problem with the option to self-impose a deadline as described in
the model setup in Section 2 for two reasons: First, the modi￿ed problem does not require
that behavior is optimal given beliefs. Second, the additional constraint w1 ￿ ￿1 does not rule
out any potential solutions of the original problem, since in that problem either the deadline
constraint w1 ￿ ￿￿1 binds, and therefore w1 ￿ ￿1 follows from the assumption 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1,
32or the deadline constraint does not bind, and so from Proposition 3 we know that the agent
optimally chooses w1 ￿ ￿1. In Step 2, we show that the w1, w2, ^ E1 [￿2], and ^ V ar1 [￿2] that
solve the modi￿ed problem in fact satisfy the additional constraints of the original problem, for
appropriate choices of deadline and prior unconditional beliefs. As a result, we have found the
solution of the original problem.









1 [￿2] that solve
max






^ E [V1] + V2
i
subject to
w1 + w2 ￿ ￿1 + ￿2,
and subject to the primitive constraints on w1, w2, ^ E1 [￿2] and ^ V ar1 [￿2], and the constraint
w1 ￿ ￿1.
Combining it with w1 ￿ ￿1, we can rewrite the resource constraint as w1 + w2 = ￿1 + ￿2.











2 + 2￿1￿2 + (3 + ￿)w2




+ ^ V ar1 [￿2] + 2￿1 ^ E1 [￿2] ￿ 2w1 ^ E1 [￿2]
￿
.
It is obviously optimal to set ^ V ar
}
1 [￿2] = 0.
(3 + ￿)w1 ￿ 3￿1 ￿ ^ E1 [￿2]













1 [￿2] = w
}
1 ￿ ￿1.









1 [￿2] = 0.
Step 2: In this step we show that the w
}
1 , ^ E
}
1 [￿2], and ^ V ar
}
1 [￿2] we have found, together
with appropriate choices for deadline ￿ and beliefs ^ E [￿t] and ^ V ar[￿t] for t = 1;2, and ^ Cov [￿1;￿2]
solve the original problem. That is, we show that there exist ￿yy and ^ Eyy [￿t] and ^ V aryy [￿t] for t =
1;2, and ^ Covyy [￿1;￿2] such that: i) Together with ^ E
yy
1 [￿2] = ^ E
}
1 [￿2] and ^ V ar
yy
1 [￿2] = ^ V ar
}
1 [￿2];
beliefs are optimal given optimal deadline choice and optimal action choice; ii) Deadline ￿yy is







2 = ￿1 + ￿2 ￿ w
yy
1 are the optimal actions given deadline ￿yy and
the aforementioned beliefs.
First we show that ^ E1 [￿2] = ^ E
}
1 [￿2] = 0 and ^ V ar1 [￿2] = ^ V ar
}
1 [￿2] = 0 are optimal. We
know from Proposition 3 that without a deadline or with a deadline that does not bind, the
optimal belief is ^ E1 [￿2] = 1￿￿
3+￿￿1, which is di⁄erent from ^ E
}
1 [￿2]. This means that potential
solutions of the original problem in which the person self-imposes a deadline that does not
bind, will not also be solutions of the modi￿ed problem. We will prove below that they are not
solutions of the original problem either, so in what follows we focus on potential solutions in
which the person self-imposes a deadline that binds. With a deadline ￿ that binds, we substitute










1 + (1 ￿ ￿)
2 ￿2





+ 2(1 ￿ ￿)￿1 ^ E1 [￿2] + (1 ￿ ￿)
2 ￿2
1 + ￿2
2 + 2(1 ￿ ￿)￿1￿2
i
,





and ^ V ar1 [￿2] for all ￿1, and so imposing the constraints
^ E1 [￿2] ￿ 0 and ^ V ar1 [￿2] ￿ 0, we conclude that the optimal beliefs are indeed ^ E
yy
1 [￿2] = 0 and
^ V ar
yy
1 [￿2] = 0, i.e., they coincide with ^ E
}
1 [￿2] and ^ V ar
}
1 [￿2].
Second, we ￿nd the optimal deadline. Since we are looking for solutions with binding dead-
lines, we have w
yy
1 (￿) = ￿￿1. To determine the optimal such deadline given optimal beliefs, we
￿nd the ￿ that solves
max
￿


















￿ ￿ ￿ 1,
where the constraint ￿ ￿ 1
2 ensures that the deadline is binding. Substituting w
yy
1 (￿) = ￿￿1 in



















> 0. The First Order Condition yields, together with
the constraint 1






























If (and only if) beliefs are such that
^ Eyy
h























Thus we have shown that beliefs consisting of ^ E
yy
1 [￿2] = 0 and ^ V ar
yy
1 [￿2] = 0, and prior
subjective beliefs such that
^ Eyy[￿1 ^ Eyy[￿2j￿1]]
^ Eyy[￿2
1] = 3￿￿
3+￿,32 together with the deadline ￿yy = 3
3+￿ and
the optimal action choice w
yy
1 = 3
3+￿￿1, form a solution of the original problem.




= 0. Under this belief, the agent believes with certainty
that ￿1 = 0 and so, anticipating that in period 1 he will choose w1 = 0 and w2 = ￿2, he is
indi⁄erent between all deadline choices, including the deadline 3
3+￿ which would result in the
agent being forced to work amount w1 = 3
3+￿￿1 = w
}
1 . Thus beliefs consisting of ^ E
yy
1 [￿2] = 0,
^ V ar
yy
1 [￿2] = 0, ^ Eyy [￿1] = 0, and ^ V aryy [￿1] = 0 (and arbitrary choices for ^ Eyy [￿2], ^ V aryy [￿2], and
^ Covyy [￿1;￿2]) together with the deadline ￿yy = 3




form another solution of the original problem.
Finally, we show that the two families of solutions we have found here are the only solutions
to the original problem. Since the modi￿ed problem we solved in Step 1 is a less constrained
version of the original problem, and since the solutions to both problems yield the same well-
being, it must be that all solutions of the original problem are also solutions of the modi￿ed
problem. But the modi￿ed problem is concave in w1, ^ E1 [￿2], and ^ V ar1 [￿2], and therefore all
solutions of both problems must have w1 = 3
3+￿￿1, ^ E1 [￿2] = 0 and ^ V ar1 [￿2] = 0. Therefore, we
can conclude from Proposition 1 that all solutions of the original problem must have ￿ = 3
3+￿.
But we have already shown that this is the optimal deadline if only if




^ E [￿1] = ^ V ar[￿1] = 0. As a result, we conclude that there are no other solutions to the original
problem.
(iii) In the variation of the model where an objective observer imposes a deadline, we need
to ￿nd deadline ￿44 and beliefs ^ E
44
1 [￿2] and ^ V ar
44
1 [￿2] that solve, respectively,
max
￿














s.t. 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1,
where w
44
1 (￿) and w
44
2 (￿) are optimal actions given by Proposition 1 evaluated using beliefs
^ E
44
1 [￿2] and subject to the constraint w
44
1 ￿ ￿￿1, and
max




E [V1 + V2],
subject to optimal action and deadline choice given beliefs and also subject to the primitive
constraints on beliefs.







yy [￿1￿2] = ^ E
yy [￿1] ^ E
yy [￿2] + ^ Cov











+ ^ V ar
yy [￿1].















since for any w1 and w2 = ￿1 + ￿2 ￿ w1 we have that





















which is at least 0, so it must be that either ^ E
44
1 [￿2] < ￿1 and so ￿44 = 1, or ^ E
44
1 [￿2] ￿ ￿1
and so the objective observer is indi⁄erent between all deadlines.
If the deadline ￿44 does not bind, then we know from Propositions 3 and 4 that the optimal
beliefs are ^ E1 [￿2] = 1￿￿
3+￿￿1 and ^ V ar1 [￿2] = 0. If the deadline binds, we already showed above
in part (ii) that the optimal beliefs are ^ E1 [￿2] = 0 and ^ V ar1 [￿2] = 0. Thus we know that
^ E
44
1 [￿2] < ￿1, and so we conclude that the objective observer imposes ￿44 = 1. Thus it must
be that ^ E
44
1 [￿2] = 0 and ^ V ar
44
1 [￿2] = 0. The choice of the prior beliefs is arbitrary, since
they do not a⁄ect well-being.
B.6 Proof of Proposition 7









+ P ￿ c ^ E1 [w2] + u(E [w2]) + P ￿ cE [w2]
i
:





^ E1[￿2] = 1
2,
dE[w2]
^ E1[￿2] = ￿1
2, and u0 (w) = ￿w, we have
dW























Setting equal to zero, substituting w￿
1 and re-organizing and taking account of the zero bound
gives:
^ E￿￿
1 [￿2] = max
￿










dc ￿ 0. Note that we are using the fact that optimal beliefs have the property
^ E￿￿
1 [￿2] ￿ ￿1, which can be shown using the same reasoning as given in the proof of Proposition
B.3.
(ii) Substituting ^ E1 [￿2] = E￿￿



















dc > 0. Substituting ^ E1 [￿2] = E1 [￿2] in w￿
1 we have wRE
1 = 1











36B.7 Proof of Proposition 8
(i) Substituting for V1, V2, and w￿






















4 (3 + ￿)￿2
1 + ￿2











2 (1 + ￿)￿1 ^ E1 [￿2] ￿ ￿2 ^ E1 [￿2]
￿2P + k￿2





￿ 2k￿2 ^ E1 [￿2]
#
For any ￿1 we have
dW






(3 + ￿ + 4k) ^ E1 [￿2] +
1
2
(1 + ￿)￿1 ￿ (1 + 2k)E1 [￿2]
￿
and so the optimal beliefs are
^ E￿￿
1 [￿2] =
1 ￿ ￿ + 4k








(3 + ￿ + 4k)
2￿1 > 0.
(ii) Substituting ^ E1 [￿2] = E￿￿





3 + ￿ + 4k
￿1,




B.8 Proof of Proposition 9
Follows immediately from di⁄erentiating ^ E￿￿
1 [￿2] and w￿￿
1 in Proposition 3.
B.9 Proof of Proposition 10







￿1 + ^ E1 [￿2]
￿
.
for ^ E1 [￿2] ￿ ￿1. Optimal beliefs have the property ^ E￿￿
1 [￿2] ￿ ￿1 for the same reasoning as
given in the proof of Proposition B.3. Substituting this optimal action and using the resource






























































37Taking the First Order Condition with respect to ^ E1 [￿2], substituting for E1 [￿2] = ￿1, and
imposing the constraint ^ E1 [￿2] ￿ 0, we have that the optimal beliefs are given by
^ E￿￿





[(1 ￿ ￿)￿1 ￿ 2(1 + ￿)a]
￿
.











[(1 ￿ ￿)￿1 ￿ 2(1 + ￿)a]
￿￿
.















for ￿1 > 21+￿
1￿￿a, while both derivatives equal 0 otherwise.
B.10 Proof of Proposition 11







￿1 + ^ E1 [￿2]
￿
.
as long as w￿
1 ￿ ￿1, which is true for objective beliefs and, for the same logic as Proposition B.3,
for optimal beliefs. Substituting this optimal action and using the resource constraint (1), the















￿1 + ^ E1 [￿2]
￿￿





1+￿￿1 + ￿2 ￿
￿






1+￿￿1 + ￿2 ￿
￿





















(1+￿)2 ￿1 ^ E1 [￿2]
3
5
Taking the First Order Condition with respect to ^ E1 [￿2], substituting for E1 [￿2] = ￿1, we have
that the optimal beliefs are given by
^ E￿￿
1 [￿2] = max
￿
0;
￿1 + ￿ + ￿2 ￿ ￿2￿
1 + ￿ + ￿2 + ￿2￿
￿
￿1








1 + ￿ + ￿2 + ￿2￿
￿
￿1.





1 + 2￿ ￿ ￿2￿
￿






2￿ (2 + ￿)
￿
1 + ￿ + ￿2 + ￿2￿
￿2￿1 > 0
for parameter values such that ￿2 (1 ￿ ￿) > (1 ￿ ￿), and
d ^ E￿￿
1 [￿2]
d￿
= 0
dw￿￿
1
d￿
=
1
(1 + ￿)
2￿1 > 0,
otherwise.
39